

October 29—November 2, 2001, University of Florida
College of Liberal Arts & Sciences Humanities Term Lecture Series 2001



HUME VARIATIONS

JERRY FODOR



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Please Post

JERRY FODOR

received his PhD from Princeton University in 1960. He taught at MIT from 1960 to 1986 as a professor of philosophy and psychology. In 1986, he became Distinguished Professor at the CUNY Graduate Center. Since 1988, he has been State of New Jersey Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers University. Fodor is the author of numerous influential journal articles, nine books, and three collections of essays, including: *The Language of Thought* (1976); *Representations of Philosophical Essays on the Foundations of Cognitive Science* (1981); *The Modularity of Mind* (1983); *Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind* (1987); *A Theory of Content and Other Essays* (1990); *In Critical Conditions: Polemical Essays on Cognitive Science and The Philosophy of Mind* (1998); *The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics* (1993); *Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong* (1998); *The Mind Doesn't Work That Way: The Scope and Limits of Computational Psychology* (2000).



TERM LECTURER



HUME VARIATIONS

JERRY FODOR



HUME'S NATURALISM

Monday, October 29, 2001

4:00—6:00 pm

Keene Faculty Center

IMPRESSIONS

Wednesday, October 31, 2001

6:00—8:00 pm

Keene Faculty Center

BASIC CONCEPTS

Thursday, November 1, 2001

4:00—6:00 pm

Keene Faculty Center

Reception to follow

JERRY FODOR & HIS WORK

Jerry Fodor is arguably the most influential and controversial philosopher of mind of his generation. His most important contribution is a sustained attempt to reconcile common-sense realism about the mind with scientific naturalism. Fodor's renowned "Language of Thought" hypothesis about the cognitive structure of the mind holds that thoughts are realized in a language-like representational medium in the brain, and are thus subject to computational principles. In addition to reviving scientific research on a modular conception of perception, Fodor has made substantive contributions to our understanding of how mental representations acquire their intentional (semantic) power, that is, their capacity to be about things in the world. In this series of lectures, using David Hume's views as a historical backdrop, Fodor continues to investigate these questions as they relate to the nature of our basic concepts (as mental representations) and how we acquire them. Debates over these topics are currently raging not only in philosophy but also in the fields of cognitive science, linguistics, and neuroscience. Fodor criticizes, time and again, some of the most fundamental assumptions made by contemporary researchers about the nature of concepts. These lectures are likely to generate a lively and heated discussion across various disciplines.



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CLAS Humanities Term Lecture Series 2001